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The Peace of Westphalia signed in 1648 signaled the beginning of the modern international system of 
states. International relations (IR) theory identifies this treaty as the founder of the principle of political 
sovereignty whereby each nation-state has full control over its territory and domestic affairs, thus it is the 
beginning of an international system of states. The latter is based on the sanctity and inviolability of 
interstate borders as its main defining feature. This paper investigates the recent developments in 
international relations and their significance to the concept of borders in IR theory; on the one hand, a 
“clash of civilizations” thesis assumes that new “fault lines” borders among civilizations of, mainly, 
different religions are taking precedence over traditional territorial borders of nation-states, while, on the 
other hand, a rise in conservative nationalism and, possibly, protectionism, over the traditionally liberal 
West reasserts the primacy of territorial borders in IR. In particular, this study examines whether such 
developments signal a paradigm shift in IR theory that may necessitate revisiting certain fundamentals 
of mainstream respective theories. 
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1. Introduction: The Emergence of Mainstream International Relations (IR) Theory 
 
The discipline of International Relations (IR) evolved as a field of academic study after World War I 
and was dedicated to addressing, in a systematic and sustained manner, the causes of war as well 
as the prerequisites for peace (Nye & Welch, 2014). Debates about theory and method are closely 
related to the question of what constitutes “knowledge”, how can we acquire it, how much we can 
assure that governors, analysts and researchers justifiably claim knowledge or how possible it may 
be for the notion of objectivity to be materialized through the quest for knowledge or toward the 
achievement of the so called “absolute truth”. In short, what are the constraints on and limits to 
knowledge with regard to the societies world-wide (Peterson, 1992)?  
Over the last century the realist theory drove the knowledge and research related with IR 
highlighting the importance of borders, mainly from a military perspective, by assuming that the 
security along with the survival of state is dependent on the role of the borders in deterring military 
activities favoring other competing states and entities (Andreas, 2003). On the other hand, over the 
                                                            
1 This paper was based on a participation at the Conference: “The Question of Borders among the Residents, 
the Passing-by and the Intermediary” at the University of Balamand, 23-25 November, 2017.  
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last decades, the globalist theory in IR assumed that “globalization” – interdependence and cross-
border interactions – has blurred the importance of physical borders as barriers and military lines. 
Borders, in this respect, have become bridges for commercial transactions. Globalization, however, 
did not assume a “borderless world”; policing cross-border clandestine activities have only 
expanded due to globalization, while territorial borders still remain a defining feature of the 
international nation-state system (Elden, 2005).  
 
2. The Historical and Methodological Background 
 
Given the tremendous debate around the IR knowledge and research, it is methodologically 
effective to attempt a correlation between the theories in dialogue and the philosophical and 
epistemological concepts underlying the international socio-political action and decision-making. In 
this line, epistemology literally studies the phenomenon of knowledge. Hence, we say that those 
who subscribe to a positivist epistemology will claim that objective, value-free, positive knowledge is 
possible in both the natural and social sciences. Of course, this applies only under the condition 
that a scientific method is pursued. In contrast, we have those who claim that only the natural 
sciences can produce such knowledge, and that a “unity of method” is neither possible nor 
desirable (Marsh & Furlong, 2002). Still others may insist that objective knowledge is simply 
unattainable in any sphere and those holding this position are called “post-positivists”. This label, 
however, covers a range of approaches from mild to quite radical ones like feminism, critical theory, 
post-structuralism, post-modernism, post-colonialism, etc. (Lawson, 2015). 
From the point of view that is called ontology, which is a branch of metaphysics concerned 
with the nature of existence or being, realities do not simply exist as sets of objects or things that 
have a material form and can therefore be seen or touched. Numbers for example do not exist as 
material objects. They are complete abstracts. “Reality” in this instance must be seen as having an 
ideational rather than a material existence. For example, the political world itself does not exist in a 
material sense. We certainly see material manifestations of political systems, usually reflected even 
in the architecture of the governments’ buildings and state monuments, but in principle the political 
world exists as a set of relations within a social system, shaped by individual and collective entities 
of the respective society,  which is fueled by ideas running the minds and actions of the people-
agents, whose decisions influence institutions and numerable stakeholders (Guizzardi & Halpin, 
2008; Lawson, 2015). 
IR theory was early developed in a context of “idealism” or “utopianism” during the post-WW I 
years, taking into account the extraordinary expectations entrusted by the followers of liberal 
institutionalism upon the League of Nations. They were immediately opposed by a very different 
approach that promised to describe IR as they “really” and actually are rather than how they 
wishfully and ideally should have been. Consequently, the IR theory of realism gained significant 
ground initially in the form of the “classical realism”, then soon after by what is now the dominant 
form of neorealism or structural realism (Buzan, Jones, Little, & Richard, 1993). Classical Realism 
operates on assumptions about human nature and the drive for power. Structural realism, however, 
highlights that it is the design of the international system itself, according to J. Mearsheimer, along 
with its specific ratios in power distribution, which circumstantially regulates the dynamics of power 
(Mearsheimer, 2003).  The main characteristic of that system and the principal driver determining 
its structure is anarchy – a status marked by the absence of a “government above the state 
governments” capable of enforcing international laws and rules (Milner, 1991). 
Neorealism or structural realism – a revised version of realism considering the systemic 
parameters of any given socio-political status – is also based on the doctrine that the international 
affairs are “anarchical” and thus, due to the absence of central ruling authorities, the countries-
states primarily pursue their own security and survival (Powell, 1994). They must maximize their 
powers, especially their military ones. In particular, states care about their relative gains and power; 
that is, their place in the context of power hierarchy among competing states. The struggle for 
control and empowerment is assumed to be an endemic characteristic of IR, whereas competition 
prevails over cooperation, while fear and conflicts drive decision making.  
Criticism to neorealism came from the neoliberal-institutionalist theory; although neoliberals also 
accept that states serve their interests in a context of anarchy, nevertheless the anarchy in terms of 
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international affairs is not the only factor having impact on the initiation and implementation of 
international cooperation (Keohane, 2011). Neorealists are usually right in case of low 
interdependence among states, i.e. when politico-economic interaction among states is minimal 
rendering fewer common interests to encourage cooperation. However, neoliberals argue that 
whenever interdependence increases, as it happened in the aftermath of WW II, the states are 
stimulated to share multiple and multi-level interests, ranging from international trade to universal 
human rights and environment protection. The mutual nature of these interests remains a precondition 
for sustainable international cooperation, although neoliberals highlight that this alone does not cover 
the wide scope and core characteristics of international cooperation. Even when the common interests 
are highly recognized and respected, the “anarchy” in international affairs, perceived as the absence 
of centralized world-wide authorities, frequently undermines the commitment needed in taking over 
reciprocal obligations demanded in a cooperation context. The lack of a central authority implies the 
worry that any opposite side, given an opportunity to better off, will break the international 
agreements. Central hierarchies and institutions may play the role of guaranteeing and safeguarding 
the respect of the international rules agreed upon (Keohane & Martin, 1995).  
According to neoliberals, the states establish international institutions in order to overcome the 
difficulties on the way to achieve cooperation. The international organizations set rules, processes 
and procedures to whom the member states are committed under the expectation that they all 
converge in a certain and focused area of international relations. The international agreements and 
arrangements decrease the transaction costs of economic operations, bolster the information 
exchanges and provide penalties for those breaking the rules, therefore, facilitating the international 
cooperation levels.   
The debate between neorealists and neoliberals is mostly interpreted as a difference in the 
priorities of those who emphasize on the states pursuing relative gains versus those who think of 
the states mainly aiming toward absolute gains: Neorealists are skeptical of international 
cooperation because they measure their power against other states in an anarchic system and they 
keep on perpetually monitoring whether their status in the context of an international power 
hierarchy is stable, constantly fearing decline above all else (Snidal, 1991). States that are oriented 
toward relative gains will refrain from cooperation as long as they worry that their gains will be less 
than those that others accrue. Thus, the imperative of absolute gains is not adequate to motivate 
states to cooperate. Neoliberals argue that states which are confident with their survival are not 
actually as preoccupied in favor of relative gains as neo-realists think; actors will cooperate so long 
as it renders absolute gains in favor of their interests.  
Both neorealist and neoliberal are rationalist theories, where the rational-choice theory 
assumptions turns the actors involved into “utility maximizers”, thus, the three following working 
hypotheses further stimulate the debate among analysts (Schimmelfennig, 1998): 
• Political actors, both individuals and states, are atomistic and egoistic, pursuing self-
interests in any possible and rational way.  
• Their interests are considered to be external to any social interactions. Individuals and 
states have pre-configured interests before they enter into social interactions; the latter 
cannot ever   critically affect the interests. 
• Society is perceived as the field where actors face each other deploying strategies and 
favoring their pre-defined interests. These actors decide independently since they are not 
by-products of their social or political environment.  
Neoliberals made one step beyond the neo-realists accepting that the international society 
exists, the states may cooperate and function international organizations, however, this happens at 
a social interaction level while at the same time they keep a separate decision making agenda, 
which is instructed by a core of identities and/or interests concretely influencing leadership’s plans 
and actions (Garcia-Contreras, 2008). Therefore, both theories are devoted to the understanding of 
an international system made of territorial states based on the Westphalian sovereignty and 
legitimacy. The only actor for neo-realists is the state, but for neoliberals several other actors affect 
international relations while the state remains the main one. Both theories dominated cold war era 
but the neorealist/structural-realist theory took precedence in its explanatory power of cold war 
politics (Waltz, 2000).  
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3. Critical Theory 
 
Critical Theory challenged the foundations of the rational theories (neorealist and neoliberal). R. 
Garcia-Contreras (Garcia-Contreras, 2008) place this challenge in the context of an ontological 
discussion, questioning the rationalistic approach that any political and/or social leadership is 
motivated by atomistic and egoistic motives, resulting in systematically served and strategically stet 
up interests, prevailing over social responsibility and interaction. The supporters of the critical 
theory argue instead that the leading actors in politics are products of the society, other word, their 
identities, attitudes and interests have been processed through their all life-long integration to 
specific social structures, usually pre-existing and transferred from previous generations to the next 
ones. They question positivism in social science and call for alternative, interpretive and qualitative, 
modules of explaining with regard to the not quantifiable and not measurable nature of human 
studies and politics. 
They also refused the method of “value-neutral theorizing”, suggesting instead that knowledge 
and experience are not absolutely and deterministically attached to interests; on the contrary, 
researchers, decision makers, theorists and practitioners should be committed, at least to try hard, 
to free the knowledge from any bias that may serve domination and oppression purposes 
(Eckersley, 2004). In this line, the so called “radical interpretivism”, supported among others by 
Foucault and Derida, opposed all efforts to evaluate, by using validity criteria,  any empirical and 
ethical opinions because this would allegedly marginalize alternative approaches and moral 
aspects, creating consequently new, powerful and dominant, hierarchies (Kincheloe & McLaren, 
2002). Habermas-modern critical theory the “critical interpretivism”, recognized contingencies as a 
by default characteristic over any piece of knowledge, i.e. all claims are inherently and inevitably 
subjective alike with the relations  among knowledge and power as well as thoughts and actions; 
however, it was accepted that several criteria are needed in order to determine the borders 
between plausible and implausible knowledge and consequent decision making, in acceptance of a 




Fig. 1 The theoretical framework of IR and its representatives (Snyder, 2004) 
 
4. The End of the Cold War and the Rise of Constructivism in IR Theories: From a Culture 
of Borders to the Borders of the Cultures 
 
During the Cold War, the main concern of western governments and IR theorists (see Fig. 1 above) 
had been to deter a nuclear war and any conventional conflict that could escalate to the nuclear 
level. Analysts developed coherent theories and engaged in debates about realism versus idealism, 
mutual deterrence and arms control, stability and instability, national interests and international 
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security, crisis management, regional integration and the viability of alliances under strain, etc. 
(Dillon, 1989). Most analysts in the field shared a common conceptual paradigm that enabled them 
to carry discussions about power, strategy, and foreign policy under conditions of bipolarity or multi-
polarity (Hopf, 1991). There were many disagreements, but they fitted into the comprehensive 
framework based on the international system of a bipolar world. 
In the post-Cold War years, a paradigm shift occurred in our thinking of world politics. 
Paradigms provide the essential basis for theory; that is, a comprehensive framework for the 
identification of the variables around which the theory is to be developed. As the first phase of 
“theory building”, the paradigm, noted as a framework for theoretical analysis, describes the 
phenomena to be investigated (Hoffman, 1989). In IR, these phenomena originally refer to the 
numbers and types of actors involved. The paradigm is essentially a means of selecting what would 
be the object of theory as well as a definition of the relationships to be examined among the 
paradigm’s components. To what extent should IR theory focus on other actors, state-related or 
not, rather than the states? What are the defining characteristics of such entities? In this line we 
could for example consider as a paradigm shift the transformation, as it was described by J. 
Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer, 2003), of a bipolar system of states in a world of two superpowers, 
along with their allies and “neutrals”, to one that has a multiplicity or multi-polarity of several types 
of powerful actors (Rosecrance, 1966). 
The end of the cold war triggered many descriptions of the transformed global setting; Francis 
Fukuyama proclaimed the triumph of the democratic and free market system as “the end of history”; 
during the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, President Bush emphatically mentioned “a new world 
order” of cooperation among nations driving to a peaceful settlement of several disputes, a new era 
in which the allied the nations over the world might be able to live up to the original expectations of 
their founding fathers, although he was criticized for secretly following a balance of power policy, 
while employing in public the rhetoric of empowering democracy, human rights, and international 
law (Dougherty, 1997). Zbigniew Brzezinski (Brzezinski, 1990) wrote that: “war has become a 
luxury which only poor nations can afford”. Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 2007) offered his own 
vision in his “Clash of Civilizations” thesis: “… the great divisions among mankind and the 
dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in 
world affairs, but the principle conflicts in global politics will occur between nations and groups of 
civilizations. The clash of civilization will dominate global politics.” The shifting political scene after 
the Cold War brought with it multiple challenges to the territorial sovereignty of the states, 
undermining traditional political borders:  
• The triumph of the so called western-type parliamentary democracy encouraged a US-led 
liberal economic order characterized by globalization and international capital flow 
tendencies (Van der Pijl & Overbeek, 2002). At the heart of this order were the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank as well as the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which in 1995 was renamed to World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The motive behind the establishment of such institutions was the aspiration that 
open markets would lead to “open” societies, while less government intervention would 
boost world-wide economic growth. Respective analysts and think tanks were 
demonstrating strong belief that in the aftermath of Soviet Union’s disruption a massive 
democratization of the world could not be anything else but inevitable (Robinson, 1996).     
• Later on, the liberal ideas were further developed including the concept that governments 
that mistreat their people and/or aggressively trouble their neighbors should not enjoy full 
sovereignty and ruling rights. A reflection of this newly-born concept, also known as the 
“Washington Consensus”, was the International Criminal Court (ICC) itself, whose role 
since 1998 was to judge which value prevails, the need for justice versus the need for self-
determination and sovereignty (Williamson, 1990). It is remarkable though that two 
decades later, the current United States (US) government severely criticizes the role of 
ICC, especially since the latter launched investigations against American citizens. 
• Back into the first decade of the new millennium, the doctrine of liberal interventionism 
dynamically emerged; that is, given the “butterfly effects” of a world broken down into 
interdependent pieces, where one sneezing in China may cause an earthquake in South 
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America, the principle of non-interference was restrained under some particular, primarily 
humanitarian respects. In 2005, the UN General Assembly declared a “responsibility to 
protect,” the notion that when atrocities happen, they cannot be disregarded by any 
citizen, organization or government; otherwise all these distant and not intervening 
international actors and neighbors share the responsibility over the wrong-doings and the 
suffering victims (Öberg, 2005). The liberal international order restricts the liberties 
enjoyed by the fundamental Westphalian sovereignty principles, national affairs may be a 
need to be externalized and scrutinized, international law precedes over national one, 
while there is no doubt that the West has the know-how of the human rights, and thus 
should spread in a missionary way the word of peace and stability in respect of the 
universal values adhering to the western standards of thinking and living (Niblett, 2017).        
• The Clash of Civilization thesis materialized on several occasions; from the cultural, ethnic 
and religious conflicts during the post-cold war era to the 9/11 attacks and the recent 
emergence of ISIS and its related global terrorism (Chaliand & Blin, 2016). 
• Others challenges to the “sanctity” of state borders came from the creation of the EU and 
the pooling of sovereignties of its member states. 
• Moreover, technological advances in telecommunication, internet and cyberspace 
somehow violate state sovereignties and compromise their borders as well.    
According to Stephen M. Walt (Walt, 1998), realism and neorealism dominated IR theory when 
the need to explain the characteristics of the Cold War appeared. Their main limitations were their 
failure to predict the end of the Cold War. Liberalism then declared and voted for democracy against 
authoritarianism, peace against conflict, interdependence, collaborative interoperability and 
institutional cooperation as well as free trade against protectionism towards wide and sound world 
peace, stability and prosperity (Burchill et al., 2013). Although they recognized the growing role of 
transnational actors, most liberals considered the state as the central player, but they failed to 
evaluate the significance of power, while they also did not foresee the end of the Cold War. Marxist 
and neo-Marxist theories as well failed over the end of the cold war when free market systems proved 
clearly more successful than their socialist competitors (Hart & Spero, 2013).  
 
5. The Constructivist Approach 
 
These changes, stemming out of numerable national attempts to fill up the vacuum of power 
created after the dissolution of the Soviet Union or the Arab Spring unrests,  promoted a new 
approach to IR theory, the constructivism, a group of theories that put the emphasis on the 
influence the ideas, as represented by cultures and literatures, exert on the ways the states along 
with their elites define: “their interests and identities as a highly malleable product of specific 
historical processes” (Little & Smith, 2005). It also highlights the significance of normative and 
material structures, the role of leading personalities and collective identities with regard to the 
decision making and action, driven by a constitutive interaction between agents and structures 
(Reus-Smit & Snidal, 2010). It used the critical assumption that humans are socially embedded and 
culturally stimulated to interpret the surrounding world politics, which had for long fallen outside the 
realm of neo-realism and neoliberalism.  
Having mentioned the aftermath of both the Soviet Union fall and the latest Middle Eastern 
turmoil, we may refer to the characteristic example of Turkey’s revisionism over the last decades, 
the so called “neo-ottomanism”, as demonstrating the overwhelming impetus of a, lost a century 
ago, ottoman cultural entity to revive and expand toward neighboring troubled areas of the region. 
From a constructivist point of view, the generic cultural category of the “caliphate” is still alive as an 
ideational scheme in the hearts and the brains of many Turkish citizens or people sharing a Turkic 
cultural background, although in practice they live in a secular state, committed to international 
constraints and western-type institutions (Ikiz, 2018). It is then considered critical to evaluate the 
role of the leading personalities spearheading the cultural shifts and consequently the re-direction 
of the history along with the societies affected; the change for the constructivists could not take 
place without the idiosyncrasies of R.T. Erdogan, T. Ozal or M. Davutoglu driving the revolution and 
giving the pace of the cataclysmic reform in modern Turkey (Bayrakli, 2012).      
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In a more general approach, constructivists hold three core propositions. First, normative or 
other words ideational notions and structures are at least of the same importance with material 
structures. Neorealists stressed the material structure of the balancing adversary military powers; 
Marxists prioritized the material structure described as a capitalist economy; constructivists though 
state that shared ideas, values and beliefs function systemically with structural characteristics and 
thus powerfully influence any social and political universe. Material and tangible resources draw 
their significance from the utility they offer while they support human action, reaction and interaction 
in the fields of communication, dialogue and shared knowledge wherever they are actually 
integrated. Perceptions of the reality, the stream of ideologies as well as the prevailing mentality of 
friendship, empathy or enmity are features applying not only among persons but similarly cultivating 
common sense and balance of powers among the states (Burchill et al., 2013). The norms and 
ideational structures emphasized by the constructivists, according to their analyses, configure the 
social identities of the political protagonists; in this way, the sovereign states themselves are 
personified carrying a character along with the qualities referring to certain behavioral trends and 
patterns. For example, during the historical period called “age of Absolutism” (1555-1848) the 
European norms out looking the structure of an international society were promoting the Christian 
monarchies as the undoubtedly legitimate scheme of territorial sovereignty and respectable regime, 
fully enhanced by the public opinion, the community customs and practices, clearly though 
undermining alternatives related with diverse liberal, middle class or nationalist policies (Fell, 1983). 
A second constructivist axis refers to the realization that the non-material structures influence the 
identities of the political actors, given the causal relation and interaction among identities, interests, 
actions, reactions and behaviors. It reminds the background investigation that psychiatrists perform in 
order to identify the pieces of information which explain their patients’ decisions and actions taken. 
The retrospective examination of how both individual and collective interests were developed explains 
political initiatives that a rationalistic approach would not even consider as long as the latter 
emphasizes on the “epiphenomenon”, i.e. facts and events on the surface, i.e. on the visible part of 
the iceberg of politics and geopolitics, ignoring the invisible one. Back to the respective example 
described above, R. Niblett (Niblett, 2017) examines in parallel the case of liberal democracy with the 
imperialism of a Christian monarchy three centuries ago, in the sense that in the end they both 
demonstrate absolutism, the former being intolerant against authoritarian regimes and/or imposing 
free market capitalism in societies that are not mature enough to appreciate it, while the latter was 
similarly controlling religion, diminishing any adversary political or national movement.  
The third axis is based on the constructivists’ suggestions that agents are mutually interacting 
with structures, therefore, they are constituted correlating each other. Normative and ideational 
structures formulate the identities and consequently the interests of the socio-political actors, while 
the structures themselves has been established under the norms and knowledgeable practices 
determined by agents and actors. The impact of intangible and non-material structures on 
identities/interests is being answered by institutional practices, which maintain and develop the 
structures. The institutionalized norms and ideas turn into a formal representation of the actors and 
their economic, political and cultural actions. The constructivists highlight the reciprocal interaction, 
given that social structures define national and international identities/interests and vice versa. 
According to Jack Snyder (Snyder, 2004) the liberal democratic statehood is being considered by 
the constructivists as the only place on earth where the international norms of democracy and 
human rights as well as free trade can flourish.         
Thus, constructivism contributed a lot in the interpretation of the 9/11 multi-level consequences, 
since it deeply scans the underlying ideologies, identities, the way people are persuaded and 
motivated to take action in ways they subjectively consider legitimate. The formation of a European 
Union is another popular subject in the constructivist studies, indicating how the cultural 
commonalities facilitate crossing the borders, bonding and sharing among sovereign nations willing to 
give up a percentage of autonomy in view of following a political vision based on the power-multiplier 
of a unification prospective. With a tone of dramatization, the war between virtue and evil forces along 
with the commitment of the wise scholars and “intellectual entrepreneurs” may change the world to 
peace, stability and prosperity. That is the reason why constructivism has been perceived as an 
update of the idealism, compatible with and inclusive of institutions, activists and social movements 
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like the Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
and many other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
It has been criticized that the inclusiveness sometimes extends to multi-dimensional movements 
like radical Islamic institutions with transnational structures and networks provoking the traditional 
national interests of the states where they operate. The constructivist standards show tolerance to 
dubious ideas and values, respecting multiple ideational norms investing in the rewards of human 
creativity and freedom to move the world toward improvement. Thus, US think tanks for a long time 
were supporting moderate versions of political Islam, like the before-mentioned Turkish Islamic 
political parties which succeeded the previous secular kemalist ones, expecting the containment of the 
Middle Eastern fundamentalism from Islamic political powers friendly to the West standards of mutual 
respect among cultures and civilizations (Snyder, 2004). According to A Judge (Judge, 2011) it is 
clear that “with respect to security, the Westphalian age is coming to an end”, while J. Lapid (Lapid, 
2001)  adds that  “the frontiers between inside and outside are under discussion …” 
Therefore, the “inter” part of the term: “international relations” seems to be thoroughly 
crisscrossed by the “sub,” the “trans,” the “intra,” and the “supra” in view of recent technological, 
social, geopolitical transformations that seem to have blurred the once distinct and relevant 
territorial contours (Lem & Barber, 2013). This development instills doubts in theories that adopt the 
territorial states as the main actors in international politics (see Fig. 2 below). Hence, constructivism 
usefully highlighted the shift in the balance of territorial, semi-territorial, and non-territorial 
determinants that shape contemporary world politics. The fact, however, that: “there is political life 
beyond territoriality,” does not mean that we are moving into a meaningless, borderless world 
(Lapid, 2001). Constructivist theories flourished in a post-cold war environment where culture, 
identity and norms seemed to be the defining feature of world politics. Territorial borders were 
marginalized and only remain meaningful as a function of hegemonic discourse and identity 




Fig. 2 Constructivism challenges the foundations of rational IR theories (Walt, 1998) 
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6. Reaffirming the Territorial State with a Return to a Culture of Borders - The Current 
Policy Implications 
 
In the past decade, the post-Cold War liberal order seems to be in trouble; severe economic 
problems, the expansion of populism along with the prevalence of authoritarianism in plenty of 
countries seem to have put the “triumph of democracy” to a halt. The political systems’ leading 
stakeholders are meeting multi-faceted criticism in a dynamically changing international 
environment, lacking control and certainty due to the globalization particularities along the reduced 
credibility and appeal of the politicians. The latest economic crises have cultivated a disbelief 
against governing elites and institutions, highlighted by mistrust against capital markets, exclusive 
privileges favoring the corporate world in combination with austerity policies for the middle class 
and the masses. People face difficulties to follow up the globalization trends, therefore, they tend to 
support political leaders like President Trump, vote against international conventions and alliances, 
like the Brexit followers did, or find comfort within populist far right or left parties, like it happened in 
Italy and Greece (Lounsbury & Hirsch, 2010).    
Well-populated parts of the western world societies, as included in the euro-atlantic political 
and geopolitical context, resist the political schemes driving to regional and/or global integration. 
Although other European countries may not follow the UK outside the EU, it is plenty of political 
parties protesting against a quick pace of EU federalization or any further convergence toward 
common institutions decreasing the member states’ sovereignty. In a similar line, the EU requests 
for sharing the hospitality of refugees among the EU members according to specific quotas have 
been rejected by many EU countries. The national control usually delays and/or challenges the 
application of EU directives and acumen (Mead, 2014). China and Russia, meanwhile, have 
modernized their armed forces, strengthened their military capacity and asserted their geopolitical 
interests and aspirations. President Putin is calling for a re-assessment of the European order, 
highlighting the rhetoric and mobilization of political and social forces like the nationalist parties 
from the British Independence Party to the French National Front and the Hungarian Fidesz, whose 
common ground is highly stressing out the national and cultural differences rather than, as Samuel 
Huntington (Huntington, 2007) states, the commonalities among the Europeans. Both China and 
Russia frequently attempt to establish a new political order capable of challenging the prominent 
western values and lifestyle, defying emphatically the traditional privilege of the West regarding 
democratization and human rights safeguarding. In a few words, the “old-fashion spies” are back 
again, looking for intelligence and information that will provide national gains and advantages. 
In contrast, the US is more inward-looking – a process that have started with President 
Obama who recalled US troops from the Middle East and encouraged his European and Middle 
Eastern allies to independently develop policies enhancing their security (Shapiro & Witney, 2009). 
President Trump advocates an “America First” policy; he renegotiates US trade agreements, 
declares appreciation for President Putin and exerts pressure toward his European allies, 
questioning his country’s commitment to NATO. Moreover, the ICC liberal attempt to critically 
update the perception of a sovereign nation-state, by creating space for external institutions to 
intervene in the internal politics and protect the citizens, is failing to be considered universally 
legitimate (Glasius, 2006).  
Even more and with regard to the geopolitics of energy, if the US geological shales provide 
the top super-power of our world with the energy volumes analysts consider as expected, based on 
the amazing scientific evolution of fracking and other similar techniques (Zeihan, 2016), the next 
generations will be fortunate or unfortunate enough to realize a future without American geopolitical 
interventions in Middle East or wherever “geoenergeia”, in the sense of geo-energy interests, apply 
(Vidakis, 2016); therefore, a future deprived from the American network of energy security 
guarantees all over the oceans and seas will probably be extremely unpredictable as well as 
unstable. These future generations will experience re-engineered energy logistics, tanker wars, 
regional competitors and challengers, maybe not the “end of history” as it was expected in the 90’s, 
but the “end of the geopolitics” we are familiar with, as they have been established by the Bretton 
Woods security architecture. It is not yet clear which scenario could follow a complete US energy 
independence and consequently their isolation in IR terms (Vidakis & Baltos, 2015).  
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The omens are not optimistic, since, even the “good news” tend to result in trade-offs. For example, 
against all expectations, the internet and multimedia high technologies, although they were 
assumed to be the vehicle of a liberal movement capable of empowering the citizens against the 
abusive authoritarian regimes, like it was characteristically depicted during the Arab Spring, have 
been occasionally developed as tools that can enhance terrorist activities, fake news campaigns, 
controversial propagandas, usually run by succeeding political regimes which implement a new 
wave of extreme nationalism and/or fanatical religious fundamentalism, violating numerous human 
rights (Niblett, 2017).    
In another paradox way, the misunderstandings around the concept of globalization, the 
confusion among several of its interpretations, from “big brother-type” global controls and 
extermination of ideological diversities to uncontrolled financial monopolies abusing people’s rights, 
contributed dramatically into a “new disorder”, where the patriotism is threatened by the nationalism 
and the idealism of international solidarity is strongly doubted by the evidences of an offensive 
realism for survival (Mearsheimer, 2003). Therefore, the recent changes in world politics, whether 
through the rise of an extreme nationalism, the diminishing appeal of a US-led liberal order or the 
growing challenge from great illiberal powers, they all promote a “conservative” return to a “rough” 
version of Westphalian sovereignty of the state and the sanctity of its borders. Plenty of historical 
events lately follow this pattern of reviving past religious and political conflicts, like for example two 
recent failed attempts for separation via referendum, the Catalonian in Spain and the Kurdistan in 
Iraq (Skidmore, 2012). This development reasserted the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq 
and Spain, despite the dubious cultural implications, and thus supports the tendency to preserve 
the existing Westphalian order. Another similar outcome comes from the Syrian civil war; that is, the 
preservation of the pre-war Syrian territory within one state, avoiding second thoughts for 
disintegration or division (Rotberg, 2004).  
In order to sum it up, the borderlines offer the supreme, currently known, environment for 
“status quo” safety, security and societal conveniences for the citizens. At the same time the 
territorial borders do not always coincide with the cultural ones, as it is being discussed with regard 
to the Sykes-Picot arrangements in the Middle East (Alobeid, Vidakis, Baltos, & Balodis, 2018); and 
this is the point where the constructivist, collective and national memories conflict with the 
geographical maps’ distortions, as they have been powerfully enforced through multiple and 
dramatic wars. A border cannot by default result in order. It is the tool, like the single knife the use 
of which is determined by the holder’s acts and intentions. The border may also bring disorder, 
where the public opinions have somehow experienced and deeply registered events like crimes 
against human cultures, violent invasions, suppression, atrocities and bloody occupations.  
History does not move backwards, but the Westphalian international order based on the 
sovereignty of the territorial state seems to be too resilient to allow for a paradigm shift that may 
weaken the explanatory power of traditional IR theories (Agnew, 2005). On the contrary, recent 
events on the international arena re-invigorated the traditional state-centric neorealist and 
neoliberal camps in IR theory. Apparently, the two opposing dynamics – territorial and non-territorial 
– cohabitate in current international relations and although the international order is still highly 
state-centric, the non-territorial cultural and religious dynamics proved to be major determinants of 
international politics (Bull, 2012). Thus, analyzing international relations necessitates the utilization 
of the rationalist territorial-state theories and the interpretive constructivist theories to be equally 
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